The term “longtermism” was first used in 2017 by the Scottish philosopher William MacAskill to refer to the viewpoint that “improving the long-term future is a key moral priority of our time.” The term gained popularity among like-minded philosophers and followers of the “effective altruism movement,” which looks at facts and logic to decide how people can most effectively better the world. The idea has suddenly become a hot topic in headlines this year.
Noting that contemporary society has a significant impact on the prospects of future generations is far from being news. In particular, the term “intergenerational justice” has gained popularity, most frequently in connection with climate change. In this context, longtermism might seem like common sense. MacAskill, for instance, acknowledges that we are not doing enough to address the threat posed by climate change, but he also identifies other potential causes of human anguish or extinction that may be even worse in the future.
The key predictions concern whether and how we can alter the likelihood of any specific future threat. Which actions would best safeguard humanity? Longtermism has drawn criticism for favouring direct philanthropic action—targeted, goal-oriented projects—to protect humanity from particular ills, much like effective altruism more generally.
Planning for the Future
In any case, longtermism offers some intriguing and thought-provoking insights. Its novelty likely lies less in how it might influence our specific decisions than in how it forces us to reflect on the thinking behind them.
This perspective is expanded by long-termism to include a shared concern for people’s well-being at all points in time, which is what impartiality in the temporal sense requires. Potential threats to humanity in the far future cannot be outright dismissed if we are concerned about the welfare of future generations, especially given the potentially staggering number of people.
The explicit consideration of future generations’ welfare raises challenging issues that are frequently overlooked in discussions of altruism and intergenerational justice. Some claim that once we understand this, we will realise that longtermism is either exaggerated or uninteresting. Future speculation also prompts consideration of how an altruist should handle ambiguity. Is it preferable to do something that will benefit a billion people today than something that has a 1% chance of benefiting a trillion people in the future?
By presenting extreme future threats as likely outcomes, the longtermism movement makes this type of philosophical reflection on everyone’s business. But there is still a significant gap between what is feasible and what ultimately matters for our actual decisions. Existing threats to humanity include the drastic loss of biodiversity and climate change, both of which we are quite familiar with.
